This paper studies the incentives of firms selling vertically differentiated products to merge. To this aim, we introduce a three-stage game in which, at the first stage, three independent firms can decide to merge with their competitors via a sequential game of coalition formation and, at the second and third stage, they can optimally revise their qualities and prices, respectively. We study whether such binding agreements (i.e. full or partial mergers) can be sustained as subgame perfect equilibria of the coalition formation game, and analyze their effects on equilibrium qualities, prices and profits. We find that, although profitable, the merger-to-monopoly of all firms is not an outcome of the finite-horizon negotiation, where only partial mergers arise. Moreover, we show that all stable mergers always include the firm initially producing the bottom quality good and reduce the number of variants on sale.
Introduction
This paper studies the incentives of firms selling vertically differentiated products to merge.
Empirical evidence shows that frequently mergers and acquisitions occur among firms selling products which are fairly differentiated along the quality spectrum. For example, most of mergers that took place after the deregulation of U.S. airline market in 1979 occurred between one big national/international carrier and one low fare local carrier (e.g. the merger between American Airlines and AirCal in 1986 or between Delta and Atlantic Southeast Airlines in 1999) 1 or, alternatively, among intermediate-quality carriers (as for Southwest Airlines and AirTran Airways in 2010). 2 The European Airlines industry similarly experienced a high number of mergers among highly differentiated airlines as, for instance, those between Air France and Air-Inter in 1999 or between Lufthansa and Air Dolomiti, started in 1993 and concluded in 2003. 3 In a similar way, the automotive industry is plenty of examples of premium segment car producers absorbing economy automobile manufacturers, as in the merger between Volkswagen Group and Skoda in 1991 or between Renault and Nissan and Renault and Dacia, both occurred in 1999. 4 As a consequence of these consolidation processes, usually merged firms proceed to a revision of their prices and qualities. 5 In some cases, the firms may decide to shut down part of their product lines, thereby putting in place a market pruning of the variants on sale. 6 For instance, Steven and Waldfogel (2001) found that the series of mergers following the 1996 Telecommunications Act drastically reduced the number of stations but increased the relative number of varieties of formats available. Sweeting (2010) and George (2007) reported similar evidence for the U.S. radio music industry and Fan (2013) for the U.S. newspaper market. 7 For airline industry, Peters (2006) observed a reduction of flight frequency on segments where merging carriers are competing against each other, whereas Mazzeo (2003) showed that carriers deteriorate their on-time performance as result of a less competitive after-merger market structure. In other circumstances, merged firms can create a fighting brand to compete more aggressively with the firms positioned at the bottom of the quality spectrum. Under this perspective, the boom of mergers recently observed in pharmaceutical industries, involving top pharmaceutical companies acquiring generics drugs manufacturers (as in the recent case of Teva absorbing Allergan Generics), might be seen as an attempt of branded firms to sell generic versions of their branded products without being objected by antitrust authorities. 8 study how the stability of price collusion in a duopoly setting is affected by the introduction of a minimum quality standard.
There are two common traits in these works. First, (i) the degree of product differentiation does not change after a coalition has formed, since the collusive behavior is restricted to pricing. This assumption is a natural entry point in the literature on cartel stability under product differentiation, as it enables to disentangle the effect of quality gap on the stability of a cartel. 16 Still, it leaves unexplored a companion question, namely the effect of the cartel on product differentiation.
Secondly, (ii) the market is populated by two firms so that it turns out to be fully monopolized by a grand coalition in the case of cooperation between firms. 17 However, casual observations show that there exist circumstances under which firms choose to form a partial merger (i.e. one including a subset of firms in the market) rather than the grand coalition. In any partial merger, colluding firms compete against some rivals outside the coalition, so that a noncooperative behavior is still preserved. Thus, the effects of a partial merger are not equivalent to those observed when all agents merge and mimic a monopolist. 18 The aim of our work is to complement the above analysis and describe the incentive of firms to merge when (i) the degree of differentiation may change once a coalition has formed and (ii) the market is populated by more than two firms. 19 The former feature of our approach somehow puts our contribution close to Lommerud and Sorgard (1997) and, within the literature on horizontally differentiated products, to Gandhi et al. (2008) and Brekke, Siciliani, and Straume (2014) . 20 Indeed, although all these authors do not consider quality as the main source of product differentiation, their analysis centers around the price-quality post-merger re-positioning which is our main aim. 21 Of course, the mechanics of mergers in markets with horizontally differentiated products is quite different from that in markets with vertically differentiated products. In a vertically differentiated market, under partial collusion, defining the optimal set of products to market requires to put in balance the cannibalization effect that a variant produced by the coalition may exert within the coalition with the possibility that this variant steals consumers from the rival firm (henceforth stealing effect). 22 In an Hotelling setting, the equilibrium configuration is also (and strongly) determined by transport costs. Still, we can borrow from them several economic intuitions on the role of strategic motives for withdrawing product. For example, under horizontal differentiation, when transport costs are extremely high, firms behave like local monopolists and the cannibalization is weak. In contrast, as transport costs tends to zero, the market with horizontally differentiated goods tends to mimic market with homogeneous products where firms do not have market power. In this alternative case, the cannibalization effect is likely to be more significant than the incentive to satisfy heterogeneous preferences so that firms can decide to remove some goods from the market in the post-merger scenario. The interaction between transport costs and cannibalization provides some useful insights to the relationship between the incentive to withdraw variants and their quality gap, in the case of vertically differentiated products. We discuss this point in the next section.
The Market
As mentioned in the introduction, firms are assumed to play a three-stage game: (i) a coalition formation game (stage 1) assumed sequential; (ii) a market game including a quality stage (stage 2) and a price stage (stage 3) both played simultaneously by the firms. Since the game is solved backward, we start below with the description of the market game and, after solving for the equilibria of the second and third stage of the game, we introduce the coalition formation game and all results obtained therein.
For the market, to keep things simple we adopt the well known specification of Mussa and Rosen's (1978) and Gabszewicz and Thisse's (1979) models of a vertically differentiated market. In particular, we assume an uncovered market initially populated by three firms, = , , selling three vertically differentiated goods, denoted , , with > > . 23 Also, for every , ∈ [0,], wherē∈ + is the highest quality level which is technologically feasible. 24 There exists a quality specific fixed cost, say = 1 2 2 . Notice that this cost does not depend on quantity, while being strictly increasing and convex in quality. The most appropriate way to model the cost function may depend on the features of the industry in which firms compete. Whenever a firm mainly faces a quality development cost (namely when the cost depends on a technology enabling it to produce a specific quality), then assuming that costs do not depend on quantity could be a reasonable assumption. Most importantly though, it can be shown that the inclusion of quantity-dependent production costs does not alter the qualitative results of the model as long as firms' marginal and unitary production costs are either constant or increase less than proportionally with quality. For instance, it is easy to prove that, for this range of cost functions and for any number of firms, the merger involving all firms in the market would put on sale only the top quality product among those previously put on sale by the competing firms. 25 Therefore, to simplify calculations, in what follows we simply assume zero variable production costs.
Let consumers be indexed by , which is uniformly distributed in the interval [0, 1], with density function denoted ( ). 26 The parameter captures consumers' willingness to pay (henceforth WTP) for quality: the higher , the higher the corresponding WTP. Each consumer can either buy one variant or not buying at all. Formally, consumers' utility can be written as ( ) = { − if she/he buys variant 0 if she/he refrains from buying.
where is the price charged by a firm for variant . From the above formulation, the consumer indifferent between buying variant and not buying is 27 :
while the consumer indifferent between buying variant and (resp. and ) is 28 :
Of course, since qualities are endogenously defined at stage 1, the profit function for firms when producing , , and can be written, respectively, as
(1) 
Equilibrium Analysis: Prices and Qualities
In what follows, we firstly present the starting point of the analysis, that is the case in which the firms decide noncooperatively prices and qualities (noncooperative equilibrium); secondly, we turn to the case in which the grand coalition of firms has formed and they can jointly decide prices and qualities (full collusion); finally, we look at what happens when firms form intermediate coalitions (partial mergers). Since prices are usually more easily adjusted than qualities, it is reasonable to assume that firms define qualities at the second stage (quality stage) and set prices at the third one (price stage). The game is solved by backward induction. So, we consider first the price stage under the assumption that qualities have been fixed. Then, we move to the quality stage.
Noncooperative Equilibrium
In this section, we briefly summarize price and quantity equilibrium obtained when the three firms compete in the market against each other, while referring the interesting reader to Scarpa (1998) for further details.
Price Stage
Differentiating eqs (1), (2) and (3) w.r.t , and , respectively, we can easily derive all firms' best-replies as 29 :
and
As stressed by Scarpa (1998) , the best-reply function of a firm depends on the quality and price of the firm itself and of its neighboring rivals, while products that are farther away in the product space do not play any role. By solving the three best replies above and including them in the firms' profits, these are obtained as functions of qualities as
where * = ( * , * , * ) denote the Nash equilibrium prices of firms obtained at the price stage (stage 3). Let us now consider the choice of qualities by firms.
Quality Stage
In order to characterize the Nash equilibrium quality choices occurring at the second stage, it suffices to maximize payoff function eqs (7), (8) and (9) 
Moreover, the corresponding subgame perfect Nash equilibrium prices * ( * ) and profits Π ( * ( * )), for * = ( * , * , * ), are immediately obtained as: * ( * ) = 0.10601, * ( * ) = 0.00912, * ( * ) = 0.0008,
and Π ( * ( * )) = 0.02348, Π ( * ( * )) = 0.00124, Π ( * ( * )) = 0.00005.
Mergers
By definition a merger can either involve the set of all firms, denoted = { , , } (grand coalition) or, alternatively, any other nonempty subset ⊂ of them, with ∈ , where = 2 \∅ is the set of all nonempty coalitions of the firms, in this case simply:
Thus, while if the firms form the grand coalition they commit irrevocably to jointly set qualities and prices so as to maximize the sum of all firms' profits (full merger), in the second scenario (partial merger), a smaller subset of firms jointly decide qualities and prices, again irrevocably, so as to maximize the sum of their own profits, while competing against a rival(s), if any. In general, we can describe any type of (full or partial) collusive or noncooperative behaviour by simply indicating the coalition structure = ( 1 , 2 , .., ) representing a collection of firms in coalition having null intersection and summing up to , with ≤ . The set of all coalition structures that can be formed by the three firms is, therefore, simply given by:
In what follows we analyze the price and then the quality stage under the assumption that either the grand coalition or any other intermediate coalition structure have formed at the first stage. After the full characterization of market equilibrium in any of these cases, we wonder which type of merger (if any) can prevail at equilibrium.
Full Merger
Let us assume that, at the first stage, firms have formed the grand coalition. In the following, we consider the price and then the quality decision.
Price Stage
When the grand coalition { } forms, at the price stage each firm maximizes the sum of all firms' payoffs eqs (1)-(3) for arbitrary levels of the quality chosen at the second stage. Thus, by the price maximization of the joint payoff of the grand coalition, firms' optimal replies , and are obtained as
By solving the system eqs (13)- (15), the optimal price profile { } ( ), for = ( , , ), is:
, and = , ,
Hence, in this case the firms' market shares at the price stage are:
It is immediate to see that, for the prices selected by the grand coalition, consumers are willing to buy only the top quality variant , the demand for the intermediate and bottom variants being nil. Accordingly, the profit accruing to the grand coalition at the price stage is
Quality Stage
In order to fully characterize the behaviour of the grand coalition, we can easily find its optimal quality, given by { } = 0.25 and its final profit is simply given by:
The logic underlying this finding has been well described by Mussa and Rosen (1978) : "Serving customers who place smaller valuations on quality creates negative externalities for the monopolist that limit possibilities for capturing consumer surplus from those who do value quality highly" (p. 306). 31 Rather interestingly, this finding does not depend on the initial assumption on market coverage. Indeed, even if one would develop the above analysis under the alternative assumption that the market is covered, still at the price-quality equilibrium the grand coalition would offer only the top-quality, while serving half of the market.
Finally, it is worth remarking that, under a full collusive behaviour, the level of prices is, for all firms, always higher than under Nash equilibrium.
Partial Mergers
In this section we analyze all market configurations arising when partial mergers take place among firms. We characterize three different market scenarios occurring, in turn, under the following coalition structures:
Before computing in detail prices and qualities of firms under partial mergers, note that from eqs (1)-(3) when either the bottom quality firm or the top quality firm collude in prices with their direct competitor, i.e. the intermediate quality firm, they just behave as in the fully collusive case, with optimal replies given by eqs (13) and (15), respectively. On the other hand, when bottom and top quality firms form a coalition, due to the structure of the vertical differentiation model, they set prices exactly as in the noncooperative case, with optimal replies given by eqs (4) and (6). Thus, under a partial merger only the price behaviour of the firm producing the intermediate quality variant
(henceforth denoted intermediate firm) varies according on whether it is allied either with its left (lower quality) or with its right (higher quality) competitor. In particular, when the intermediate firm coordinates its price with its left competitor, its first-order condition implies
whereas, when it coordinate its price with its right-competitor, it sets such that Π + Π = 0. As a result, the optimal reply of the intermediate firm, ( , ) in the left-partial (resp. ( , ) in the right-partial) merger writes as
(resp.
Partial Merger between the Intermediate and the Bottom Quality Firm
We consider initially the scenario where at the first stage a merger has occurred between firm and firm , with firm playing as singleton against them.
Price stage As coalition structure , = ({ } , { , }) forms, prices , and set by firms 1, 2 and 3 at the price stage can be obtained through the maximization of Π and (Π + Π ).
Using eqs (4), (15), and (19), the following equilibrium prices are set by firms:
with corresponding profits:
Note that in this case the price of the low quality variant is set so high that no consumer is willing to buy this variant and, therefore, { , } = 0. Thus, firm ceases to be active in the market: selling the bottom-quality variant would determine a cannibalization effect within the coalition since variant would be in competition only with the adjacent product . Of course, it still plays a role in the coalition as the decision to stop producing benefits the coalition as a whole. 32 Quality stage Then, moving to the quality stage and using the best reply functions, it is immediate to see that top variant and intermediate variant are set, respectively, equal to
Given the above, we can easily find the equilibrium prices as
and the corresponding equilibrium profits:
It is easy to see that, at equilibrium, firm continues to produce the top quality while coalition { , } sells the intermediate quality only. Notice also that the above findings coincide with those emerging, for instance, in Motta (1992) where only two firms compete in a traditional duopoly setting. Indeed, coalition { , } behaves like a multiproduct firm: since it withdraws from the market one of its variant, it is as if only two single-product firms would be active in the market, each of them setting noncooperatively their quality and price. We resume these results in the next proposition. 
Proof.
It directly follows by expressions eqs (21), (22) and by their comparison with the results obtained, for instance, in Motta (1992) .
Finally, it is worth remarking that this merger benefits both the merging firms and the rival which plays as a singleton. Indeed, not only the lowest quality variant is dropped out from the market, but also the gap between variants in the market is now larger than the one emerging in the noncooperative setting with three independent firms: under partial collusion, the optimal quality of the intermediate variant is lower (and the top quality higher) than the corresponding levels set noncooperatively. This relaxes price competition between firms, thereby increasing the resulting profits.
Partial Merger between the Top and the Bottom Quality Firm
Let us move now to the case in which at the first stage firms and have merged, whereas firm plays as singleton.
Price stage To obtain the optimal prices decided by the merging firms and and by firm alone, we need to take into account the fact that colluding firms and maximize the sum of their profits Π + Π , while is only concerned with its own profit function Π . However, since firm and are not direct price competitors and are separated by firm , at the price stage their equilibrium prices and profits coincides with those obtained in the noncooperative case (cfr. Section 2.1.1).
Quality stage We can now move to the quality stage. In order to identify the optimal qualities, notice that the joint profit of coalition { , } is monotonically decreasing in , namely
Accordingly, at the quality stage for colluding firms and it is profitable to set = 0, whatever the quality chosen by the intermediate rival . The economic intuition underlying this finding is that the low quality variant and the intermediate variant are strategic complements. So, if the merging firm increases , the independent firm producing would increase its quality variant, thereby making tighter the competition with the top quality producer. 33 Since the profit loss suffered by firm when decreasing its quality level is lower than the gain obtained by firm (since the competition between and relaxes), the merging firms will optimally set = 0 restricting their production only to the high quality variant . As a result, from the first-order conditions obtained maximizing, in turn, the profit of coalition { , } w.r.t to and the profit of rival w.r.t , given that, at equilibrium ({ , },{ }) = 0, we obtain that, under }) , and ({ , },{ }) = ({ },{ , }) for both = , , so that 
Proof.
It directly follows from the above calculations and from direct comparison of equilibrium configurations.
It is worth noting the rationale underlying the equilibrium configuration of coalition , . When merged, the top and bottom quality firms reduce the bottom quality to such an extent that the corresponding market share for this variant turns out to be nil. In withdrawing variant from the market, the coalition takes into account two different effects. On one hand, since the low quality variant is adjacent to the intermediate variant, ceteris paribus, increasing its quality can enable the coalition to gain market share from the competitor producing variant and, thus, to benefit from the higher profits obtained by the bottom quality firm. On other hand, as these two variants and are strategic complements, the higher quality of the bottom quality variant boosts the quality of the intermediate variant. The latter variant is, in turn, in direct competition with the top variant: since the lower the quality gap, the fiercer price competition between players, the higher the intermediate quality, the lower, ceteris paribus, will be the profit accruing to the top quality firm. Since the loss for this player when the low quality is produced is higher than the gain obtained by the bottom producer, coalition { , } will prefer to stop producing this variant.
Partial Merger between the Top and the Intermediate Quality Firm
We finally characterize the equilibrium configuration when the top and the intermediate quality firm decide to merge, with the bottom quality rival playing as singleton.
Price stage Under coalition structure , = ({ , } , { }), we obtain the following last stage equilibrium prices:
Quality stage It is easy to check that, at the price stage, when the coalition structure , = ({ , } , { }) forms, no variant is withdrawn from the market. Still, at the quality stage, it can be proved that coalition { , } finds strategically optimal to withdraw variant from the market. This is done in the next proposition.
Lemma 1. In order to escape from the cannibalization taking place between adjacent variants, merging top and intermediate quality firms withdraw variant
from the market. As a result, the rival sells a product which is now adjacent to variant .
Proof.
See the Appendix.
Notice that now, profit Π (({ , },{ })) coincides with that obtained by firm when producing variant in coalition structure
. Thus, the variant produced by the merging firms coincide now with those produced under coalition structure , = ({ } , { , }) where intermediate and bottom quality firms were colluding. Moreover, in , = (({ , } , { })) the independent firm produces now the variant that in the the previous scenarios was sold by the intermediate quality firm, while keeping the same bottom position along the quality ladder. In line with the analysis performed in the previous case, the optimal variants are immediately obtained here as:
while the equilibrium profits write as:
Thus, one can state the following proposition. 
This follows directly by Proposition Lemma 1 and by a comparison of the various market subcases considered above.
For ease of exposition, we summarize in the following table the payoffs accruing to each firm or coalition in each feasible coalition structure. 
It is worth remarking how the same market structure (duopoly) arises in all partial mergers independently of which pair of firms decides to merge. Still, the profits accruing to the firms depend on the coalitions to (against) which they belong (compete).
Equilibrium Analysis: Stable Mergers
In this section we first consider the problem of coalition formation between three firms from a cooperative perspective, in order to see whether and when there are advantages and incentives for firms to merge. For this purpose we first compare the cooperative stability of the grand coalition when firms are ex ante identical to the case in which, as in our setting, they are ex ante heterogeneous, namely they are initially selling vertically differentiated products as independent firms. After showing that, in term of stability, things go quite differently in these two cases, and that, under the quality stickiness condition, heterogeneous firms possess very strong incentives to merge, we introduce our specific finite-horizon game of coalition formation. We show that in equilibrium firms get engaged in partial rather than full mergers. Hence, it becomes important to evaluate which, among the partial mergers, are more likely to arise in our setting, and which underlying forces determine such results.
The Profitability and Cooperative Stability of the Grand Coalition
As initial observation, and as clearly illustrated in Table 1 above, in terms of total payoff the grand coalition is, not surprisingly, the most profitable coalition structure obtainable in the vertical differentiated market. Thus, we may wonder whether the grand coalition is, in general, robust against coalitional deviations. More specifically, we may wonder whether, there are feasible allocations of the monopoly profit belonging to the core of the transferable utility game associated to our simple model. An accurate analysis shows that the answer to this question crucially depends on the initial assumptions of the game. In particular, if the players (firms) are assumed to be ex ante identical and (contrarily to our case) there is no pre-assigned level of quality among them when the negotiation starts, the core of the corresponding cooperative game (in partition function form), turns out to be empty. Even worse, no intermediate coalition structure is stable even against individual deviations.
Empty Core with ex ante Identical Firms
The emptiness of the core with ex ante identical firms can be easily shown as follows: it is natural to think that three ex ante identical firms = 1, 2, 3 would equally divide the monopoly profit, that in our model is obtained by producing only the top quality product, namely Π = Alternatively, if the remaining firms split up into singletons and a triopoly forms, the firm leaving the merger would obtain Π ({ },{ },{ }) = 0.02348. 35 In both cases the deviation is profitable and the efficient equally-split monopoly payoff is not sufficient to prevent that at least one of the firms breaks the cooperative agreement to become the top-quality producer. Analogously, all partial mergers are unstable. In fact, inside every partial merger { , }, for every , ∈ , jointly selling either or against an independent rival, at least one of the two firms could always try to break the agreement and sell, independently, either or . Thus, since an ex ante identical firm in a partial merger receives either Π ({ , }{ℎ}) { , } /2 = 0.0122 when the merger produces or Π ({ℎ},{ }) { , } /2 = 0.00076 when it produces , these payoffs are largely dominated, respectively, by Π ({ },{ },{ℎ}) = 0.02348 and Π ({ },{ },{ℎ}) = 0.00124. The same result would arise in a sequential bargaining protocol, since the first firm along the sequence would always announce its willingness to remain singleton to produce , the second to remain singleton to produce and the third, similarly, would remain alone producing . As a result, in a vertically differentiated market in which firms are ex ante identical and free to select their qualities and prices in a two-stage market game, any negotiation procedure would presumably yield a coalition structure in which all firms remain independent. This outcome, by the way, is what we take as starting point of our coalition formation game. Before any merger can take place, firms are characterized by pre-assigned quality levels, due to their previous history: say, they are either Volkswagen or Skoda. However, as in our model, once entered a coalition, they can jointly adjust their quality-price combinations, although keeping the quality ranking among active firms unaltered (stickiness). In the next section we will show how, while the assumption of ex ante firms' heterogeneity is crucial for predicting the negotiation outcome, since it provides players with specific ex ante outside options, the latter assumption (stickiness) is the one which allows the firms to form stable coalitions.
Nonempty Core with ex ante Heterogeneous Firms
If firms are assumed, as in our game, ex ante heterogeneous and constrained to an initial quality ranking, it can be easily proved that the core is nonempty. This is because now the monopoly profit can be allocated asymmetrically according to the initial identities (and outside options) of the players, i.e., , and . Formally, we can associate to the vertically differentiated market a partition function game = ( , ( , ( ))), where is the set of firms and ( , ( )) ∈ is the worth associated to every coalition of firms ⊂ embedded in a given coalition structure ∈ of which is part. In our model, when an alliance ⊂ forms, its maximal payoff obtains when the remaining firms stick together in the complementary coalition { \ }. 36 Therefore, if the core of the partition function game exists when every ⊂ is embedded in = ({ } , { \ }), it will a fortiori exist in any other coalition structure containing . Let us formally state this result.
Definition 1.
The core of the partition function game = ( , ( , )) consists of all efficient profit allocations Π ∈ | | + such that ∑ ∈ Π ≥ ( , ( )) for all ⊂ and for all ( ) in which can be embedded.
Thus, we can prove the following result.
Proposition 4.
In the three-firm vertically differentiated market with ex ante heterogeneous firms , , and endogenous qualities and prices, the core of the corresponding partition function game = ( , ( , )) is nonempty.
Proof.
If the stickiness condition holds, the above result simply says that in a vertical differentiated market with firms initially competing noncooperatively in prices and qualities, there would always be room for a cooperative agreement between them. 37 This is because, starting from their initial outside options, there exist divisions of the monopoly payoff that cannot be improved upon by any coalition of firms, which includes their departure as singletons. The grand coalition of firms would also be the outcome of an infinite-horizon sequential coalition formation game with ex ante heterogeneous players, where for a sufficiently high discount rate there would always be room for full cooperation. 38 However, as we show in the next section, if the bargaining process is sequential and in each period the firms possess only a finite set of possibilities to propose coalitions and divisions of the joint profit to the rivals, i.e. the game possesses a finite-horizon, the grand coalition cannot be enforced in equilibrium. 39 In particular, we show that only intermediate coalition structures (partial mergers) can be sustained as subgame perfect equilibria of the alliance formation game. The study of which merger, among all feasible partial ones, is more likely to arise in the three-firm negotiation, is the purpose of the next section.
The Coalition Formation Game
Our game of coalition formation occurs at the first stage of the game. Following Bloch (1995 and , and Ray and Vohra (1999) we model the process of coalition formation as a sequential unanimity game in which, in an exogenous order, firms propose to their rivals an alliance to which they also belong. 40 The firm which follows in the given order among those receiving the proposal may, in turn, either accept or reject it. In case of acceptance, the turn passes to the subsequent firm in the proposed alliance according to the exogenous order and, if all proposed firms accept, the alliance is irrevocably formed and its members can decide cooperatively qualities and prices. If, alternatively, one of the firms rejects the offer, it becomes its turn to make a proposal and the game continues with the same logic until a given coalition structure of the firms is obtained. Differently from Bloch (1996) and Ray and Vohra (1999) and following Selten (1981) and Chatterjee et al. (1993) we let the allocation rule be part of the bargaining process. 41 Specifically, when it is its turn to offer, a firm proposes both a merger and a division of the merger profit among its members. The reason for this departure from their model is that since in our coalition formation game the players (firms) are ex ante heterogeneous, no obvious fixed allocation rule can be assumed (for instance, an equal split division of joint payoff) before the negotiation takes place. A second distinction of our coalition formation game with respect to Bloch's (1996) and Ray and Vohra's (1999) is that our game is finite-horizon, one in which every player is allowed to make at most one proposal at each period. This means that when a firm proposes a merger and is rejected, it can enter a coalition only when proposed by another firm (and it accepts), remaining singleton otherwise. As explanation of this model assumption we can simply say that mergers' time horizon is usually finite, rather than infinite. In particular, publicly traded companies commonly issue tender offers to accomplish mergers and acquisitions, thus offering a given price to shareholders who, in turn, have to decide with a yes or no by a given time. Our finite-horizon-single-proposal bargaining protocol may be intended to capture an institutionally constrained negotiation process for merging parties. In this setting, the order of play can be crucial for the final outcome. We will discuss again below the implications of our assumptions.
In formal terms, our merger formation game is a triple = ( , {Σ , Π } ∈ ), with player set = { , , }, strategy set Σ and payoff Π ( ) ∶ Σ → . For every firm (player) ∈ , a strategy ∈ Σ defines the actions ∈ available at each node (or information set ∈ ) in which it is its turn to play. In our game, an action for a firm ∈ can either be an element of the set {Yes, No} coming in response to another firm's proposal with ≠ or, in turn, a proposal = ( , Π) including an alliance ⊂ to which belongs to and a division Π ∈ | | of the alliance joint profit Π , such that ∑ ∈ Π = Π . Thus, for a firm a strategy ∈ Σ is a mapping from its information sets to the set of its feasible actions available therein, namely, ( ) ∶ → , where ⊂ ((2 \ {∅} , | | ) ∪ {Yes,No}), with the property that, in every period, a proposal ∈ (2 \ {∅} , | | )
can be made by a firm only if, when it is its turn to play, there are no other players' proposals on the floor and the firm itself has not already made a proposal. That is, for every firm ∈ the action available at every information set is ( ) = if both ( ) = ∅ for ≠ and ({ } < ) = ∅ for any previous information set, and ( ) ∈ {Yes,No} otherwise. Note that every strategy profile = ( , , ) of induces an outcome ( ) = ( ( ) , Π ( )), namely a coalition structure ∈ and a profile of payoffs Π = (Π , Π , Π ) assigned to firms in . The payoff of every firm Π ( ( )) ∈ Π is obtained by associating to each coalition structure a price-quality equilibrium profile ( ) as already illustrated in Section 2. As last step, we need an equilibrium concept for the game occurring at the first stage, namely a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPE) of the coalition formation game and, accordingly, a notion of stable coalition structure.
Definition 2.
A subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPE) of the coaliton formation game is a strategy profile such that, for every firm ∈ , every proper subgame ′ ⊂ , and every ∈ Σ , Π ( * , * − ) ≥ Π ( , * − ).
Definition 3. A coalition structure ∈ (a partition of the firms) is stable if and only if it is sustained by a SPE * of the coalition formation game, namely, = ( * ).
Once again, it is important to mention that the outcome of the game would be completely different if the firms were free to change their quality ranking. In this case no merger would arise and all firms would remain independent producing three vertically differentiated goods, as at the starting point of our coalition formation game. So, we might imagine our three heterogeneous firms as the result of a (failed) negotiation process previously occurred among three identical firms playing in absence of any stickiness condition. 42 
Stable Mergers
In this section we characterize all equilibria of the sequential game of coalition formation. Since this game is sensitive to the identity of the initial player, we consider, in turn, the outcomes obtained by the game when either firm , and are the initiators of the bargaining process. Let us first consider the case in which the firm producing the top-quality good (firm H) is the initiator of the coalition formation game.
It can be proved the following:
When firm is the initiator of the coalition formation game, the only stable coalition structure is , = ({ } , { , }), where firm continues to produce variant and the two remaining firms and .
Proof.
The main mechanisms driving the result of the above proposition are mainly two: one is the fact that the negotiation occurs in a finite horizon and every player has only one turn of proposal to play; a second one, related to this, is that the last player can potentially exploit its "last mover advantage", by forcing the other players to accept their outside options. For these reasons, the game initiator (here firm ) has a strong incentive to avoid to be exploited within any coalition and, anticipating this, prefers to play as singleton, knowing in advance that the remaining firms will merge to play in a duopoly rather than remaining independent and competing in a triopoly. Therefore, in a nutshell, the result of Proposition 5 strongly hinges on the identity of the initiator of the game, here firm , and on the finite horizon of the game.
Applying the same rationale, in the next proposition, one can easily show that, when firm is the initial player, , = ({ , } , { }) is the only stable coalition structure.
Proposition 6.
When firm is the initiator of the coalition formation game, the only stable coalition structure is , = ({ , } , { }), where firm and jointly produce variant and firm produces variant .
Proof.
Notice how, in both Proposition 5 and 6, the initiator of the game is never part of a merger in equilibrium. Indeed, as shown in detail in the proofs of both propositions (see the Appendix), the payoff of a firm when remaining singleton (and rationally expecting that the other firms will merge) dominates that of being part of the grand coalition in the role of initial proposer. The equilibrium profit accruing to either firm or when initiating the game and competing with two merged rivals is, in fact, larger than when they take part to a merger as first-mover. Their optimal strategy is, thus, to induce the remaining firms to merge. About the role played by the (exogenous) order of play (here , , except when a player rejects a proposal becoming the new game's initiator) it should be observed that this does not play a crucial role in shaping the stable mergers but rather the firms' final equilibrium payoffs. For instance if, in the case considered in Proposition 6, it was to play after , the main difference would be that firm could exploit in full its last mover advantage, granting its merger's ally (firm ) a lower payoff.
Another relevant force underlying the outcomes of the coalition formation game is the inherent difficulty of firms and to engage in a joint merger. This feature explains the rather different type of merger occurring when firm (the bottom quality one) starts the negotiation. In this case, firm cannot credibly commit to remain independent when the remaining firms ( and ) prefer to play as singletons rather than merge (see Table 1 ). The reason is that the merger between firm and is problematic just because in this circumstance stops producing its variant and has to share the top quality firm duopoly payoff with firm , payoff that turns out to be lower than the sum of their individual profits under triopoly (cf. Section 2). Knowing in advance the infeasibility of coalition { , }, as game initiator firm prefers strategically to let firm to play independently, while forming an alliance with firm . This is shown in the next proposition.
Proposition 7.
When firm is the initiator of the coalition formation game, the only stable coalition structure is , = ({ } , { , }), where firm produces variant and and jointly produce variant .
Proof.
It is worth noting that if the game initiator would be selected at random, the most likely outcome of the merger formation game would be that in which the coalition structure , = ({ } , { , }) forms, the other possible outcome implying the formation of , = ({ , } , { }). Moreover, although at equilibrium the same coalition structure , forms both when either firm or starts the negotiation, there is a difference in term of rent extraction, in the two cases, for merged firms and : when firm is the one starting the negotiation, firm in merger { , } only receives its outside option Π = Π * = 0.00124, whereas firm is able to get a profit
− Π * = 0.00027 > Π * as reward of its last-mover advantage in the sequential game. When, on the other hand, it is the firm to start the game, firm in alliance { , } receives Π ({ },{ , }) − Π * = 0.00147 > Π * = 0.00124, while firm only receives its noncooperative payoff Π * = 0.00005. In both cases, firm receives its duopoly payoff Π = 0.02443.
Quite surprisingly, in the merger formation game firm enjoys a first-mover advantage, just because, when it starts the negotiation, it is able to enforce
higher than in all other cases. Moreover, this comes at expense of firm , which in coalition structure , only receives its noncooperative payoff Π * = 0.02348. As a final observation, it can be noticed that, since for any order of play our one-shot coalition formation game always sustains a unique equilibrium coalition structure, the subgame perfect equilibrium of the finite repeated version of the game will generate the same outcome at any period. We condense this conclusion in the next corollary.
Corollary 1.
If the coalition formation game is repeated for a finite number of periods, the coalition structures which are stable in the one-shot game will continue to be so in the finite-horizon repeated version of the game, sustained by the same SPE strategy profile repeated at every period.
Therefore, even in a repeated finite-horizon framework, the stability of The results of our coalition formation game, confirms that the most likely mergers occur between intermediate and bottom-quality producers, with the premium quality brands preferably running alone. This is the case of some top car producers as, for instance, Daimler-Benz, whose only participation is in the production of Smart, initially started as a joint venture with Nicolas Hayek, the inventor and producer of Swatch. Our findings also indicate that mergers between intermediate and bottom quality firms, as those occurred between Volkswagen and Skoda, or between Renault and Dacia in the automotive industry, should be the norm. In these cases, the bottom quality product is withdrawn from the market, which can be interpreted by saying that of all products sold by the merger have a tendency to converge towards the same level of quality of their premium brand products. Moreover, the model highlights how the mergers between top and bottom quality firms are also likely, as for instance those occurring between generics pharmaceutical manufacturers and premium brand pharmaceutical companies. In this case, low quality products can be profitably retired from the market, in order to soften the competition among the remaining goods.
Concluding Remarks
We have investigated the endogenous formation of mergers in vertically differentiated markets in which full or partial binding agreements among initially heterogenous firms can be signed over prices and qualities of the products, under the respect of the initial quality ranking existing among firms. We have shown that regardless of the profitability of the full collusive agreement (i.e. the one signed by all firms in the market), such an arrangement is not obtained in a (finite horizon) sequential negotiation process requiring the unanimity of firms. Conversely, we found that the sequential bargaining process enforces only partial collusive agreements, namely those involving subsets of firms. In particular, stable associations of firms always include the firm producing the bottom quality variant, which is, however, never sold by the coalition at equilibrium. Further, whatever the coalition structure arising at the equilibrium, the market moves from a triopoly to a duopoly with only two variants on sale.
There are some assumptions of the model which deserve to be discussed, also in view of its possible extensions.
First, we have assumed that only three players populate the market. While this assumption represents a natural entry point, one may wonder whether our main findings can be extended to the case of a market populated by firms, with > 3. In the case of firms, partial collusion can take place among a group of firms selling variant located at the bottom of the quality ladder, in the middle or at the top. In the first case (resp. the last case), a bottom cartel (resp. a top cartel) competes against a fringe of firms, each of which sells a higher (resp. lower) quality variant than the ones produced by the cartel. In the case of an intermediate cartel involving firms whose qualities lie in the middle of the quality ladder, it competes against lower and higher quality rivals. Whatever the type of cartel, we can guess that the two drivers (demand driver and cannibalization driver) which have been shown to affect the choice of keeping all variants on sale vs. withdrawing some of them are still active. So, even in the case of > 3, it has to be ascertained whether the former driver prevails over the latter. 43 Moreover, we assume that initially each player is a single-product firm. In line with this, in the post-merger scenario, a priori at most three variants could be observed at equilibrium: two of them would be produced by the merged entity, while the third would be marketed by the competitor. 44 Of course, one might wonder why we are not concerned with the case of multiproduct firms. From a theoretical viewpoint, the solution to the dilemma between single-product vs. multi-products is mainly depending on the income dispersion and the specification of the cost function. In the seminal papers by Sutton (1982, 1983) and Gabszewicz et al. (1986) , it is shown that, in the case in which a firm acts as a monopolist, offering a single variant can be optimal, in absence of costs, if the income dispersion is sufficiently narrow. So, taking the parameter as a lower bound of the market, a necessary condition for the single-product to emerge at equilibrium is that > 0. Otherwise, namely when = 0, then the specification of the cost function determines the optimal choice of variants. Interestingly, income dispersion and costs have been identified as major drivers of the production choice even later and in a different setting of vertical differentiation. Acharyya (1998), for example, proves that without any ex-ante restriction on market coverage, the choice of a monopolist to be single-product can depend on the specification of the cost function. In his analysis, a firm optimally offers a single variant whenever the cost of quality does not increase too fast. 45 When moving from a monopoly to a imperfectly competitive market, even under an income constraint, it is shown that a firm refrains from selling more then a single variant (see on this Bonnisseau and Lahmandi-Ayed 2006) .
Finally, a priori it is not clear whether the cannibalization driver could still hold in an alternative specification where the lowest willingness to pay is strictly positive. In this case, it can be shown that when the intermediate and bottom quality firm merge, the low quality variant is withdrawn from the market at the quality stage rather than at the price stage. So, when consumers are income-constrained, it is no longer profitable for firms to use a price strategy to drop a variant from the market and thus, if quality would be exogenously given, it would be possible to observe a multi-product strategy by the merging firms.
In spite of the above intuitions on these open questions, an in depth analysis of these issues, in particular of the case with > 3, is left for future research. 
Proof.
At the quality stage, firms' profits are:
It is easy to see that, the joint profit of merger{ , } is monotonically decreasing in , as
Thus, the merging firms find it profitable to set the quality of one of their variants at the minimum admissible value, say 0. By doing this, they choose to produce a variant which is at the bottom of the quality ladder. If the competitor would keep its own variant at the same quality level, then it would obtain nil profits. Rather, choosing to produce an intermediate variant > 0 would yield positive equilibrium profits equal to
As this profit is strictly positive for any > > = 0, one can conclude that firm will find profitable to leapfrog the post-merger bottom quality variant put on offer by coalition { , }, namely = 0, by producing an intermediate quality variant (denoted above ).
Proof of Proposition 4
Proposition 4. In a three-firm vertically differentiated market with ex ante heterogeneous firms and endogenous qualities and prices, when the stickiness condition holds, the core of the partition function game = ( , ( , )) is nonempty
Proof.
Core allocations are individually-rational and group-rational profit division Π = (Π , Π , Π ) of the efficient monopoly payoff ( ) = Π { } = 0.03125. Thus, the set of Π ∈ Core( ) must respect the following inequalities:
which surely hold, since:
0.02443 + 0.00152 + 0.00152 = 0.02749 < 0.03125.
Note that for every -th firm, ({ } , ({ } , { \ { }})) > ({ } , ({ } , { } , {ℎ})) for every , ℎ ∈ \ { }, implying that each firm gains more when the remaining firms form a coalition than when playing alone. Thus, the last numerical inequality holds a fortiori when, after one firm leaves the grand coalition, the remaining firms splitup in singletons. As a result, all efficient payoff allocations Π = (Π , Π , Π ) rewarding every firm at least its maximal deviating payoff and distributing the remaining surplus between the three firms, namely,
belong to the core, which is, therefore, nonempty. If, on the other hand, the stickiness condition does not hold and every firm is free to become, without cost, the top quality one, thus either expecting that the remaining firms would play independently or stick in a coalition, every firm could obtain Π 
Proof of Proposition 5
Proposition 5. When firm is the initiator of the coalition formation game, the only stable coalition structure is , = ({ } , { , }) , where firm continues to produce variant and the two remaining firms and only market variant .
Proof.
The game can be solved backward. Firm's available actions at the initial node (information set 1 ∈ ) are the following (proposals):
Assume first that firm proposes the grand coalition { } associated to a given division Π ∈ Π { } of the efficient monopoly profit between the three firms. By the order of the game, firm can either accept or reject. If it rejects the offer, it is its turn to make a proposal and can propose one of the following:
We know (from Table 1 ) that, for any associated payoff division, the coalition structure , = ({ , } , { }) is dominated by the choice of firm and to play as singletons, since
Therefore, when made by firm , the proposal = ({ , } , Π) will always be rejected by firm . In this event, firm has no more proposals to make. Thus, firm can gain its highest payoff by proposing { }, offering the noncooperative profits to and and get the difference Π { } − Π * − Π * , which is its most profitable outcome. To break the ties, we can initially assume that, when gaining equal payoffs all firms prefer being in a coalition than remaining singletons (although the reasoning can be repeated when the alternative case holds). A similar outcome would be reached if, after a rejection, firm proposes = ({ , } , Π) or = ({ } , Π) which, in turn, would be both refused by firm , aiming to propose (as last proposer) the grand coalition, obtaining Π = Π { } − Π * − Π * . Analogously, if firm accepts to enter the grand coalition when proposed by firm , it knows that, when it is its turn to play, firm will always reject such proposal to propose, in turn, the grand coalition with a payoff allocation which assigns to its rivals their Nash equilibrium payoffs. Reasoning backward, firm knows that, if it proposes the grand coalition, it would obtain at most its Nash equilibrium payoff. For this reason, firm can try to make alternative offers. Proposing = ({ , } , Π) is out of question, since player would always reject it, and the game would return to the situation described above. Another chance for firm is to propose = ({ , } , Π) that, in turn, would be rejected by firm with the aim to propose again ({ , } , Π), offering to firm its noncooperative outside option. Alternative proposals by firm (after its rejection of { , } proposed by firm ) involving firm , as = {{ } , Π} or = {{ , } , Π} would similarly be rejected by firm to enforce, as last proposer, the grand coalition payoff. Thus, at the initial node the most profitable action for firm is to propose = { }, signalling the intention to play irrevocably as singleton. By doing this, it is aware that firm can either propose = ({ , } , Π) or = ({ }). In the first case, firm knows that firm will reject to propose, in turn, = ({ , } , Π), offering Π * to firm and keeping the difference, since:
In the second case, namely when firm proposes = { }, a triopoly arises and firm obtains Π * . Since with equal payoffs firms prefer by assumption to be in a coalition rather than remaining as singletons, in this subgame the choice of firm will be = ({ , } , Π). Therefore, the coalition structure , = ({ } , { , }) is stable because can be sustained by the following SPE strategy profile along the equilibrium path:
where
If we assume, to break ties, that with equal payoffs firms prefer to be singletons rather than being in coalition, the same coalition structure , can be enforced by a SPE of the coalition formation game with the difference that, along the equilibrium path,
The same occurs in all other proposals implying the presence of a coalition. The reason is that to convince a firm to join an alliance it must receive something more (an > 0) than its noncooperative payoff. Therefore, coalition structure , remains stable (namely supported by a SPE strategy profile of the sequential coalition formation game) for every adopted rule to break ties. Finally, to see that , is the only stable coalition structure arising when firm is the initiator of the game, note that any alternative strategy profile cannot be SPE just because firm possesses an incentive to profitably deviate by proposing = { } with the expectation to compete in a duopoly (namely under , ) and gaining a payoff Π (( ),( )) = 0.02443 which dominates its triopoly profit Π * = 0.02348 (or in turn, Π * + ).
Proof of Proposition 6
Proposition 6.When firm is the initiator of the coalition formation game, the only stable coalition structure is , = ({ , } , { }).
Proof.
As above, the game can be solved backward. Firm's available actions at the initial node (information set 1 ∈ ) are:
( 1 ) = [({ } , Π) , ({ , } , Π) , ({ , } , Π) , ({ })] .
Again, if firm proposes the grand coalition { }, with an associated division of the monopoly profit Π ∈ Π { } , the next player, firm , would reject the offer to propose, in turn, one of the following:
( 1 1 ) = [({ } , Π) , ({ , } , Π) , ({ , } , Π) , ({ })] .
Coalition structure , = ({ , } , { }) is dominated by the choice of firm and to play as singletons and proposal = ({ , } , Π) is, therefore, rejected by firm . If this occurs, firm has no more proposals and, hence, firm can propose { }, obtaining Π = Π { } − Π * − Π * , which is its most profitable outcome. Similar outcome would be reached if, after a rejection, firm offers, in turn, = ({ , } , Π) or = ({ } , Π), which can either be accepted or refused by firm , but nevertheless the final payoff would, for firm and , be their noncooperative outside options. Thus, reasoning backward, firm knows that by proposing the grand coalition it would receive at most its noncooperative payoff. Its alternative proposals are = ({ , } , Π) which would be rejected by firm (so the game would reach the same outcome described above) or = {{ , } , Π} which, in turn, would be rejected by firm with the aim to propose = {{ , } , Π}, offering firm its noncooperative outside option, which turns out to be better than any other coalition containing firm that would, in fact, exploit its last mover advantage. Note that forming alliance { , } would, for firm , be better than any other proposal involving firm , that could exploit its last-mover advantage. Thus, at the initial node, the most profitable action for firm is to propose = { }, with the knowledge that firm prefers to be in coalition than playing as singleton proposing = {{ , } , Π} rather than = { }. Hence, the proposal by firm would be rejected by firm , that can counter-offer, in turn, = {{ , } , Π}, giving Π * to firm and keeping the difference for itself, since Π ({ , }{ }) − Π * > Π * . As a result, the coalition structure , is the only stable coalition structure when firm is the initiator of the coalition formation game just because in any alternative strategy profile firm would always prefer to propose = { } and compete in a duopoly with a payoff Π ({ , }{ }) = 0.00152 rather than getting its triopoly profit Π * = 0.00124 (or in turn, Π * + ), which occurs in all other subgames.
Proof of Proposition 7
Proposition 7.When firm is the initiator of the coalition formation game, the only stable coalition structure is , = ({ } , { , }).
Proof.
Again in this proof we reason backward. Note that when firm is the initiator of the game, the line of reasoning is slightly different than in Proposition 6 and 7. Firm's available actions at the initial node (information set 1 ∈ ) are:
no longer holds when products are differentiated along a quality dimension. In this latter case, "the removal of intermediate quality goods can soften competition between goods remaining in the post-merger market" (Norman, Pepall, and Richards 2005, p. 1206) . 45 Even more relevant, a further driver can affect the solution to this dilemma, namely the distribution of consumers in the market. On this point, when there exists only two different types of consumers and each type is parametrized by a parameter capturing his preferences (or tastes), it may well happen that, regardless of the cost, the monopolist decides to serve only a part of the market and to drive the low-type consumers out of the market. In Acharyya (2005), however, the constraining effect of income can induce the monopolist to discriminate among consumers. In particular, Acharyya (2005) shows that while differences in preferences do not prevent the monopolist to optimally sells a single variant, under income disparity, a proliferation strategy (quality discrimination) is observed at equilibrium. Moreover, quality discriminating can be observed both when the low-income consumers are income-constrained and in the alternative case when also the high-income consumers are income constrained. Still, in this latter case, the profitability to discriminate among consumers is related to the tastes differences compared with income differences so that discrimination can also induce the monopolist to underprovide quality to the high-income consumers. 46 We have verbally described all out of equilibrium path actions which compose the SPE strategy profile * and, therefore, for ease of simplicity, we do not repeat it here. 47 Again, for simplicity, we skip the description of all players' out of equilibrium actions.
